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Abstract—Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-
B) is the communications protocol currently being rolled out as
part of next generation air transportation systems. As the heart
of modern air traffic control, it will play an essential role in
the protection of two billion passengers per year, besides being
crucial to many other interest groups in aviation. The inherent
lack of security measures in the ADS-B protocol has long been a
topic in both the aviation circles and in the academic community.
Due to recently published proof-of-concept attacks, the topic is
becoming ever more pressing, especially with the deadline for
mandatory implementation in most airspaces fast approaching.
This survey first summarizes the attacks and problems that
have been reported in relation to ADS-B security. Thereafter, it
surveys both the theoretical and practical efforts which have been
previously conducted concerning these issues, including possible
countermeasures. In addition, the survey seeks to go beyond the
current state of the art and gives a detailed assessment of security
measures which have been developed more generally for related
wireless networks such as sensor networks and vehicular ad hoc
networks, including a taxonomy of all considered approaches.
Index Terms—ADS-B; aviation; air traffic control; NextGen;
security; wireless; privacy; broadcast
I. INTRODUCTION
The world of air traffic control (ATC) is moving from
uncooperative and independent (primary surveillance radar,
PSR) to cooperative and dependent air traffic surveillance
(secondary surveillance radar, SSR). This paradigm shift holds
the promise of reducing the total cost of deployment and
improving the detection accuracy of aircraft. However, it is
well known in the aviation community that the ATC system,
which is currently being rolled out, called automatic dependent
surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B), has not been developed with
security in mind and is susceptible to a number of different
radio frequency (RF) attacks. The problem has recently been
widely reported in the press [1]–[5] and at hacker conven-
tions [6]–[8]. Academic researchers, too, proved the ease of
compromising the security of ADS-B with current off-the-
shelf hard- and software [9]. This broad news exposure led
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to put
the security of civil aviation on their agenda of the 12th air
navigation conference, identifying “cyber security as a high-
level impediment to implementation that should be considered
as part of the roadmap development process” [10] and creating
a task force to help with the future coordination of the efforts
of involved stakeholders.
This shows that there is a widespread concern about the
topic, created by the fact that ADS-B will be mandatory for all
new aircraft in the European airspace by 20151 and has already
been embraced by many airlines worldwide. Reports from
manufacturers and regulation bodies show that around 70-80
percent of commercial aircraft worldwide have been equipped
with ADS-B transponders as of 2013 [11], [12]. Countries such
as Australia have already deployed full continental coverage,
with ADS-B sensors being the single means of ATC in low
population parts of the country [13].
This paper gives an overview of the research that has been
conducted regarding the security of ADS-B and describes the
potential vulnerabilities identified by the community. Since
much relevant security research has been conducted in related
fields such as wireless sensor networks or general ad hoc
networks, we analyze proposed countermeasures from other
areas that could be adapted for use in ADS-B or whether
they are not applicable for reasons inherent to the system.
Furthermore, the present survey provides a threat catalogue,
analysis and vulnerability categorization of the mainly used
data link Mode S. We focus primarily on the security of
ADS-B and not on other air traffic control (sub-) systems,
such as GPS. Among other questions, we seek to answer
why existing ideas for securing (wireless) networks such as
traditional cryptography cannot simply be transferred and used
in the protection of systems such as ADS-B.
While there were a number of reasons behind the switch to
a modern air traffic management system, cost has consistently
been mentioned as one of the most important ones throughout
the process; existing radar infrastructures are simply much
more expensive to deploy and maintain [14]. ADS-B, on the
other hand, provides significant operational enhancements for
both airlines and air traffic managers. The increased accuracy
and precision improves safety and decreases the likelihood for
incidents by a large margin, unless the system’s weak security
is exploited by malicious in- and outsiders.
The remainder of the survey is organized as follows: Section
II gives a detailed overview over the security problems related
to ADS-B and the requirements of the system environment.
Section III outlines solutions proposed in previous works and
looks at the sister protocol ADS-C and military versions of
ADS-B. Section IV surveys secure broadcast authentication
methods to address the problem while Section V reviews
means to establish secure location verification with ADS-B.
Section VI summarizes and Section VII concludes the survey.
1Older aircraft need to be retrofit by 2017. The FAA mandates ADS-B in
the US airspace by 2020.
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Figure 1. ADS-B hierarchy [9]. The 1090 MHz Extended Squitter is based
on the traditional Mode S system and provides the data link for ADS-B in
commercial aviation. UAT is a new development but currently only mandated
for general aviation.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section defines the problems related to security in
ADS-B more thoroughly. First, we give a short overview
over the currently used ADS-B protocol and its existing
vulnerabilities. Building on this, a model of the ADS-B
environment is outlined and the required attributes of possible
solutions are identified.
A. ADS-B Protocol Overview
The American Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as
well as its European pendant EUROCONTROL named ADS-
B as the satellite-based successor of radar. At its introduction,
ADS-B was a completely new paradigm for air-traffic control.
Every participant retrieves their own position and velocity
by using an onboard GPS receiver. The position is then
periodically broadcasted in a message (typically twice per
second) by the transmitting subsystem called ADS-B Out. The
messages are then received and processed by ATC stations on
the ground as well as by nearby aircraft, if equipped with the
receiving subsystem ADS-B In. Messages can integrate further
fields such as ID, intent, urgency code, and uncertainty level.
Two competing ADS-B data link standards have been pro-
posed: Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) and 1090 MHz
Extended Squitter (1090ES). UAT has been created specifi-
cally for the use with aviation services such as ADS-B, utiliz-
ing the 978MHz frequency with a bandwidth of 1Mbps. Since
UAT requires fitting new hardware, as opposed to 1090ES, it is
currently only used for general aviation in EUROCONTROL
and FAA-mandated airspaces. Commercial aircraft, on the
other hand, employ SSR Mode S with Extended Squitter,
a combination of ADS-B and traditional Mode S known as
1090ES (see Fig. 1). In other words, the ADS-B function can
be integrated into traditional Mode S transponders. From here
on, we focus on the commercially used 1090ES data link. The
complete overview over the ADS-B protocol can be found
in the specification documents [15]–[17] while various other
works give succinct, higher level descriptions of the protocol
(e.g. [6], [9], [18]).
The 1090ES Data Link: As the name suggests, the 1090ES
data link predominantly uses the 1090MHz frequency for
communication sent out by aircraft, to both other aircraft and
ground stations (Mode S also uses ground to air communica-
tion at 1030MHz for interrogations and information services).
Figure 2. Overview of the ADS-B system architecture. Aircraft receive
positional data that is transmitted via the ADS-B Out subsystem over the
1090ES or the UAT data link. It is then received and processed by ground
stations and by other aircraft via the ADS-B In subsystem.
Figure 3 provides a graphical view of a 1090ES transmission,
which starts off with a preamble of two synchronization pulses.
The data block is then transmitted by utilizing pulse position
modulation (PPM). With every time slot being 1µs long, a bit is
indicated by either sending a 0.5µs pulse in the first half of the
slot (1-bit) or in the second half (0-bit). It is important to note
that PPM is very sensitive to reflected signals and multipath
dispersion, a fact that can play a major role in security and
protocol considerations.2
There are two different possible message lengths specified
in Mode S, 56 bit and 112 bit [15], whereas ADS-B solely uses
the longer format. The downlink format field DF (alternatively
UF for uplink messages) assigns the type of the message.
1090ES uses a multipurpose format as shown in Fig. 3. When
set to 17, it indicates that the message is an extended squitter,
enabling the transmission of 56 arbitrary bits in the ME
field. The CA field indicates information about the capabilities
of the employed transponder, while the 24 bit AA field
carries the unique ICAO aircraft address which enables aircraft
identification. Finally, the PI-field provides a 24 bit CRC to
detect and correct possible transmission errors. It is possible
for recipients to correct up to 5 bit errors in 1090ES messages
using a fixed generator polynomial of degree 24.
This quick overview shows that only the 56 bit ME field
can be used to transmit arbitrary data, i.e. utilized for a secure
ADS-B solution. However, not only is it very limited in size
but it is also typically occupied by positional and other data.
Thus, the format as currently in practical use is intuitively very
limiting to most types of security solutions as we will explain
in more detail in this survey.
2See [19] for more information on PPM and multipath.
3Preamble
8.0 sµ
Data block
56 or 112 sµ
Bit 1 Bit 2 Bit 3 Bit 4
Bit
N-1 Bit N
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
8.0 9.04.53.5
Time ( s)µ
0.0 1.00.5
DF:5         CA:3          AA:24                         ME:56                           PI:24
Figure 3. 1090 ES Data Link [9]
Relation to Legacy Systems
Traditionally, aircraft localization has been relying on radar
systems which had been developed for military applications,
namely identification, friend or foe (IFF) systems. There are
two different concepts in conventional radars: primary surveil-
lance radars and secondary surveillance radars [20]. PSRs are
independent; they work without cooperation from the aircraft
by transmitting high-frequency signals, which the target object
reflects. The echo identifies range, angular direction, velocity,
size and shape of the object. SSR, on the other hand, uses
interrogations from ground stations which are responded to
by transponders in aircraft. The reply includes information
such as the precise aircraft altitude, identification codes or
information about technical issues. In contrast to PSR, this
approach is also much more accurate in terms of localization
and identification. As all surveillance data such as position and
status are derived directly by the aircraft, SSR is dependent.
Furthermore, cooperation by the aircraft is a requirement.
Before ADS-B, all SSR systems in ATC have been
interrogation-based. So called modes are being used to query
the identification and altitude of an aircraft. There are three
modes (A, C and S) currently in use in civil aviation, Ta-
ble I compares their characteristics with ADS-B. The latter
embodies a paradigm shift in ATC as air traffic surveillance
is now cooperative and dependent, i.e. every aircraft collects
their own data such as position and velocity by using onboard
measurement devices. ADS-B based surveillance infrastructure
is also much more cost-effective compared to conventional
PSR, which is a much more complex technology that also
suffers from wear and tear due to rotating parts. ICAO specifies
the technological cost of using primary radar to monitor an
en-route airspace (200NM radius) at $10-14 million, while
Mode S surveillance is priced at $6 million and ADS-B is
significantly cheaper at $380,000 [21].
B. ADS-B Vulnerabilities
In this section, we discuss the ADS-B vulnerabilities
inherently stemming from the broadcast nature of RF
communication when used without additional security
measures. Contrary to wired networks, there are no practical
obstacles for an attacker trying to access a wireless network
such as buildings or security guards, making access control
mechanisms very challenging. In [18], McCallie et al. defined
a taxonomy for various possible attacks, even though their
difficulty estimations have become somewhat dated with the
widespread availability of cheap software-defined radios as
recently illustrated in [9]. Despite this, the described attacks
Message
Length
Frequencies Operational
Mode
Use Cases
Mode A 12 bit 1030 /
1090 MHz
Independent /
Non-selective
interrogation
Identification
Mode C 12 bit 1030 /
1090 MHz
Independent /
Non-selective
interrogation
Pressure
Altitude
Extraction
Mode S 56 / 112 bit 1030 /
1090 MHz
Independent /
Selective
interrogation
Multiple
ADS-B /
1090 ES
112 bit 1090 MHz Dependent /
Automatic
Multiple
Table I
COMPARISON OF CIVIL AVIATION TRANSPONDER MODES [22].
are ordered in increasing order of difficulty here, providing
a comprehensive attacker model in the context of ADS-B
vulnerabilities.
Eavesdropping: The most straightforward form among
the many security vulnerabilities present in ADS-B is the
act of listening in to the unsecured broadcast transmissions.
This passive attack is called Aircraft Reconnaissance in
[18]. As ADS-B is using unsecured messages over an
inherently broadcast medium, the possibility to eavesdrop
is not surprising and has been mentioned since the early
stages of development. Many non-adversarial services use
this obvious privacy concern, e.g., to visualize air-traffic on
the Internet,3 yet eavesdropping also forms the basis for a
number of more sophisticated active attacks. Furthermore,
eavesdropping is not only difficult to prevent without applying
full encryption but it is also practically impossible to detect.
A small number of countries (such as the United Kingdom)
have long-standing, very general laws against listening in
on unencrypted broadcast traffic which is not intended for
the recipient4 even though the technical realities render such
legal approaches all but obsolete.
Jamming: Almost equally simple is the jamming attack,
where a single node (both ground stations or aircraft) or an
area with multiple participants is effectively disabled from
sending/receiving messages by an adversary sending with suf-
ficiently high power on the 1090MHz frequency of Mode S. It
has generally also been proven feasible to do reactive jamming
in real time, targeting only packets which are already in the air
as assessed in [23]. While jamming is a problem common to all
wireless communication, the impact is severe in aviation due to
the system’s inherent wide open spaces which are impossible
to control as well as the importance and criticality of the
transmitted data. Besides SSR communications systems such
3Prominent examples are flightradar24.com and radarvirtuel.com among
many others.
4Section 48 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 2006 states that (1) “A person
commits an offence if, otherwise than under the authority of a designated
person— (a) he uses wireless telegraphy apparatus with intent to obtain
information as to the contents, sender or addressee of a message (whether
sent by means of wireless telegraphy or not) of which neither he nor a person
on whose behalf he is acting is an intended recipient, or (b) he discloses
information as to the contents, sender or addressee of such a message.”
4Attacks Layer Method Severity Complexity References
Aircraft Reconnaissance PHY+APP Eavesdropping Low Lowest [6], [9], [18]
Ground Station Flood
Denial
PHY Signal
Jamming
Medium Lower [6], [9], [18],
[23], [24]
Aircraft Flood Denial PHY Signal
Jamming
Medium Low-Medium [6], [9], [18],
[23], [24]
Ground Station Target
Ghost Injection / Flooding
APP Message
Injection
High Low [6], [9], [18]
Aircraft Target Ghost
Injection / Flooding
APP Message
Injection
Medium Low-Medium [6], [9], [18]
Virtual Aircraft Hijacking PHY+APP Message
Modification
High Medium [9], [25], [26]
Virtual Trajectory
Modification
PHY+APP Message
Modification
High Medium [9], [25], [26]
Aircraft Disappearance PHY Message
Deletion
High Low [9], [18]
Aircraft Spoofing PHY+APP Message
Modification
High Low [6], [9], [24]
Table II
OVERVIEW OF VULNERABILITIES IN THE ADS-B PROTOCOL. THE TABLE SUMMARIZES THE ATTACKS INCLUDING SEVERITY AND COMPLEXITY.
as ADS-B, primary radar may also be a target of jamming
attacks which is similar in many ways, most importantly the
fact that one always jams the receiver (in our case ATC
systems), not the transmitter.5 A thorough introduction to radar
and communication jamming can be found in [27].
Due to rotating antennas and a higher transmission power,
typical PSRs are more difficult to jam than ADS-B receivers,
especially for non-military grade attackers. However, as there
are usually many distributed ADS-B receivers for ATC pur-
poses, it still takes considerable effort to completely blackout a
given area. Notwithstanding this, a targeted attack would cre-
ate major denial-of-service problems at any airport. Jamming
moving aircraft is also possible, however considered more
difficult. In summary, jamming is integral for the following
attacks [18]:
• Ground Station Flood Denial
• Aircraft Flood Denial
Message Injection: On the next higher level of difficulty,
it is also possible to inject non-legitimate messages into
the air-traffic communication system. Since no authentication
measures are implemented at the data link layer, there is no
hurdle at all for an attacker to build a transmitter that is able to
produce correctly modulated and formatted ADS-B messages.
See [9] for more details on how to conduct an attack with
limited knowledge and very cheap and simple technological
means which have been easily and widely available for some
time. As another direct consequence of missing authentication
schemes, a node can deny having broadcasted any (false) data
and/or claim having received conflicting data, making any
kind of liability impossible. Concrete attack instances that use
message injection include [18]:
• Ground Station Target Ghost Injection/Flooding
• Aircraft Target Ghost Injection/Flooding
5Of course, PSR does have both a transmitter and a receiver, while ADS-B
ground stations are dependent on the tracked targets’ transmissions.
Message Deletion: Legitimate messages can be physi-
cally “deleted” from the wireless medium by utilizing de-
structive or constructive interference. Destructive interference
means transmitting the inverse of the signal broadcast by a
legitimate sender. Due to superposition, the resulting signal
should be erased or at least highly attenuated but in practice
this approach has very precise and complex timing require-
ments, making it extremely challenging.
Constructive interference on the other hand does not require
synchronization but simply causes a large enough number
of bit errors. Since Mode S extended squitters’ CRC can
correct a maximum of 5 bit errors per message, if a message
exceeds this threshold, the receiver will drop it as corrupted.
While effectively destroyed, the receiver might at least be
able to verify that a message has been sent, depending on the
implementation and the circumstances. In any case, it is more
subtle than complete jamming of the 1090MHz frequency.
Besides providing an easy means of message modification in
conjunction with message injection, message deletion is key
to the following attack:
• Aircraft Disappearance
Message Modification: Modifying messages on the phys-
ical layer during transmission is typically done via two differ-
ent approaches, overshadowing and bit-flipping. Overshadow-
ing means that the attacker sends a high-powered signal to re-
place part or all of the target message. Bit-flipping on the other
hand has the attacker superimposing the signal converting any
number of bits from 1 to 0 (or the other way around). In both
cases arbitrary data can be injected without the knowledge of
any of the participants. This effect can also be achieved by
combining message deletion and injection, but physical layer
message modification can in some cases be regarded as even
more sinister than the injection of a completely new message,
since the manipulated message was originally legitimate. The
feasibility of such message manipulation has recently been
shown in [25] and [26]. Concrete attack examples are [9]:
5• Virtual Aircraft Hijacking
• Virtual Trajectory Modification
C. Identification of System Requirements
There are a number of demands on a security approach
for ADS-B, stemming from the way it is needed to work in
practical real-world aviation settings and the characteristics
of the broadcast approach. We first codify the model and
then follow up with an analysis of what we need to have as
security primitives in air traffic control systems.
Network Properties:
• The assumed network model consists purely of unidirec-
tional broadcasts. Although there is a growing body of re-
search on Aeronautical Ad hoc Networks (AANETs) that
provide multi-hop communication [28], the present real-
world implementation is based on single-hop unidirec-
tional broadcast links. Aircraft broadcast their position,
velocity and direction in plain-text periodically every few
hundred milliseconds, a concept called beaconing. Thus,
in the following we concentrate mainly on the so-called
beacon-based security.
• We do not consider any type of energy constraints in
association with ADS-B devices.
• Furthermore, there are no significant computational
constraints with neither ground stations nor ADS-B units
employed in aircraft.
• Reliability has not been a major concern yet, as some
lost packets do not normally cause a problem. Indeed, the
protocol does have no means to prevent collisions, the
sender will not retransmit any packets and no guarantees
are given. Loss is dealt with on higher layers. This is also
reflected in [9], which shows that the packet error rate
tends to hover around a mean of 33 %, independent of the
channel. This means that there is some substantial packet
loss on the physical layer that is likely to increase when
the channel utilization rises over the next decades due to
the mandatory ADS-B roll-out. This will be reinforced
by the ever-increasing flight traffic,6 especially in high-
density airspaces.
• The network is ad hoc and highly mobile. Many nodes
are moving at a velocity of up to 1,000 km/h or more. It is
therefore extremely dynamic and communication between
two nodes may last only a few seconds. Aircraft trajec-
tories are principally not physically restricted, although
there are often common routes and also some air spaces
that are restricted due to policies.
• The network is long range, typically ADS-B is consid-
ered to be feasible at distances of 100 NM and more.7
• In contrast to other, independently deployed wireless
(sensor) networks the undetected physical capture of
6Growth rate forecasts from market analysts suggest a 5.1% increase per
year between 2010 and 2030. Cargo traffic is expected to grow even more at
5.6% per year in the same time frame [29].
7Aviation typically uses the nautical mile, also abbreviated as nmi, as a
distance measure which is 1,852m.
legitimate nodes is not the most important concern.
Legally having access to a legitimate ADS-B node,
however, is not considered very difficult, at least when
taking general aviation into account.
Security Attributes: Perrig and Tygar [30] identify two large
themes around which secure broadcast revolves: First, make
sure that receivers know that any received information comes
from the appropriate sender, and second that senders can freely
limit the recipients of broadcasted information. Confidentiality,
e.g. the protection of ADS-B position messages to prevent
attacks in air or loss of trade secrets, has not been considered in
the development of the system as laid out in a formal security
requirements engineering for ADS-B in [31].
In light of the recently exploited inherent vulnerabilities of
the ADS-B system with cheap off-the-shelf hardware [6], [9],
this is quickly becoming the most important topic in ADS-
B research. Based on the model defined above, any security
scheme for ADS-B would have to satisfy the following prop-
erties:
• Data integrity: Ensures that the data is the same as has
been provided by the sender and has not been modified
by any third party.
• Source integrity: Ensures that a message originates from
the participant that claims to have sent it.
• Data origin authentication: Ensures that a message orig-
inates from the location claimed in a message.
• Low impact on current operations: A scheme should be
compatible with the current ADS-B installations and not
overly affect both hard- and software standards.
• Sufficiently quick and correct detection of incidents.
• Needs to be secure against DoS-attacks against comput-
ing power.
• Any approach needs to be easily scalable. This is in re-
spect to both a locally rising aircraft density and globally
increasing aircraft traffic. The strain on the heavily used
1030 MHz channel should not measurably increase (e.g.
due to an increased number and/or larger packets).
• Robustness to packet loss. A jammed wireless channel
should decrease neither security nor reliability of the
scheme.
• Achieving non-repudiation is seen as nice to have but
not very high on the priority list for immediate air traffic
security and is more of a legal topic.
III. OUTLINING SOLUTIONS
Substantial work has already been done on ADS-B security
over the last decade and several approaches have been pro-
posed in the literature to enhance ADS-B security in particular.
Furthermore, a large amount of research has been done in
related fields such as vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) and
wireless sensor networks where broadcast authentication and
security also play an important role. While some ideas may
not be directly useful to the aforementioned requirements of
ADS-B, it might be possible to adapt them. We list the major
obstacles for their application, along with the advantages and
disadvantages of each approach.
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Figure 4. Taxonomy of ADS-B Security
The remainder of this section first presents an overview
of works in the community concerned with the security of
ADS-B as a whole. We then consider ADS-B’s sister protocols
ADS-C and military versions of ADS-B in our context before
analyzing all collected ideas in detail in the following sections.
As shown in the taxonomy in Fig. 4, we identified two
distinct approaches to securing ADS-B: Secure Broadcast
Authentication and Secure Location Verification. Conse-
quently, Section IV examines the various schemes that apply
asymmetric properties (cryptographic and non-cryptographic)
to directly authenticate broadcast communication while Sec-
tion V reviews several different methods that seek to verify
the authenticity of location claims made by aircraft and other
ADS-B participants.
A. Previous Works on ADS-B Security
Securing ADS-B communication was not a very high pri-
ority when it was specified to be the new standard in civilian
secondary surveillance. Neither the official standards of the
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) [15]–
[17] nor other requirements documents [32], [33] mention
security in this context. However, security problems in ADS-B
have been well-known for a long time, mostly because they are
relatively obvious to the interested researcher.8 For instance,
weak ADS-B security has recently got very broad reporting in
the mainstream press9 due to two talks at the DEFCON and
Black Hat security conferences.10
Sampigethaya and Poovendran [34], [35] first analyse the
security and privacy of ADS-B and other related and unrelated
communication systems which are part of the so-called “e-
enabled aircraft”. McCallie et al. [18] provide a current
security analysis, focused on the nature of possible attacks
and their difficulty. They give a systematic high-level overview
and propose general recommendations for addressing ADS-
B’s problems. Costin and Francillon [6] as well as Schaefer et
al. [9] analyse ADS-B security, too, focusing on the ease of
8Especially on the Internet broad warnings have been floating
around as early as 1999, e.g. http://www.airsport-corp.com/adsb2.htm,
http://www.dicksmithflyer.com.au/cat_index_36.php
9E.g. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/07/25/next-gen-air-
traffic-control-vulnerable-to-hackers-spoofing-planes-out-of-thin-air/
10http://www.blackhat.com/usa/bh-us-12-briefings.html#Costin
exploiting ADS-B with current hard- and software and offering
some possible countermeasures.
Kovell et al. [36] mention data fusion with other systems,
multilateration and various cryptographic schemes as state of
the art research on ADS-B security. They further conduct a
more thorough analysis on Kalman filtering and group vali-
dation concepts and proposed mitigation methods. Nuseibeh
et al. conduct an example of a formal security requirements
analysis of ADS-B [37], proposing multilateration to deal
with possible attack scenarios. Burbank et al. [38] present
general concepts for communications networking to meet the
requirements of future airspace systems, i.e. a vision of a
mobile ad hoc and wireless networking concept for use in both
the terminal area and in the en-route airspace. Li and Kamal
[39] analysed the security of the whole FAA’s Next Generation
Air Transportation System (NextGen) of which ADS-B is a
core component.11 They develop a high-level defense-in-depth
framework for analyzing NextGen and mention general secure
communication approaches such as encryption, authentication
and spread spectrum as part of a possible ADS-B security
layer that would need to be examined more deeply.
The number of works relating to the security of ADS-B
has been increasing steadily as the final mandate for its use
in US and other Western airspaces is drawing closer and
the problem is becoming more urgent. While the existing
works pertain the need for security and offer insights into
different aspects, especially multilateration and data fusion,
the present work seeks to widen the understanding of the
communications community and address the problem on a
much broader and more comprehensive scale. We look to
compile all previously considered aspects, seek to include
some applicable, overlooked ideas from other areas of network
security, and weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the
examined approaches against each other.
B. ADS-C
A theoretical, already available, way to deal with suspicious
ADS-B participants would be to ask them to switch to the
connection-oriented ADS-C (ADS-Contract, also known as
ADS-Addressed). However, ADS-C also has a number of very
severe inherent shortcomings, some of which are described by
ICAO: [41]
• Additional avionics systems (for data communications)
such as the Future Air Navigation System (FANS) 1/A
or the Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN)
are needed.
• Its performance may be limited by the communications
medium.
• Currently, ADS-C data is carried by a data link service
provider, so a cost may be incurred for each transmission.
• Unlike the ADS-B IN system, ADS-C messages are not
directly available to other aircraft.
11Although certainly not the only safety-critical wireless module. See e.g.
[40] for concerns about the impact of GPS integrity on aviation safety.
7Overall, the current implementation of ADS-C over the out-
dated ACARS network12 considerably limits its usefulness. It
is also violating the basic requirements of ADS-B as it is a sys-
tem that sends on demand instead of periodically broadcasting
without being requested. Connection-oriented protocols lack
most of the advantages that the paradigm change with ADS-
B provides to modern ATC (specifically cost, scalability and
ease of use), which is why ADS-C has not been considered
any further in the development of NextGen.
C. Communication in Military Avionics
There is undoubtedly a much stronger need and motivation
to implement stringent security in a military communications
context. Though it is not the primary focus of this survey,
anything in practical use by military forces could naturally
be of interest for civil security solutions as well. There are
various standards currently in use by the US and NATO mil-
itary, among them the cryptographically secured Mode 4 and
Mode 5 as defined in the NATO Standardization Agreement
(STANAG) 4193. Mode 4, which employs a 3-pulse reply to
a challenge, has been in use for decades and according to
the forecasts of the NATO Minimum Military Requirements
is to be superseded by Mode 5 in 2015 (initial operational
capability) and 2020 (full operational capability), respectively
[42].
While the legacy Mode 4 indeed only allows airplanes to
respond to challenges, Mode 5 adopts the ADS-B broadcast
capability, so participants can announce their presence without
a prior query, very useful in identification, friend or foe
[43]. On the security side, Mode 5 uses proprietary hard-
ware and encryption algorithms with a black key concept;13
it furthermore offers time-of-day authentication, automatic
switchovers and a longer period [44]. The signal modulation
is done via spread spectrum and operation requires a platform
identification number (PIN). Mode 5 hardware is equipped
with a unique identifier that informs about national origin and
the platform number. Mode 5 has two different levels: Level
1 is the interrogation response mode, providing time, position
and identification based on both GPS and traditional means.
Level 2 is the broadcast mode and entirely based on GPS.
There are currently no further available details on the security
mechanisms including the applied cryptography of Mode 4
and 5 since this information is classified.
The ADS-B specification itself also mentions the message
types/downlink formats Military Extended Squitter (DF19) as
well as Military Use Only (DF22) without detailing them
further, although it is known for example that DF19 makes
ample use of bursts instead of regular beacon messages only
[45]. Despite incomplete or unavailable information on the
performance of Mode 5 compared to ADS-B, it is safe to say
that both cost, scalability and ease of use of the known aspects
of the system are prohibitive to widespread use in commercial
12The Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System
(ACARS) will be superseded by the Aeronautical Telecommunications Net-
work (ATN) and IP communication over the next decade.
13Black keys are safe to transmit since they are encrypted with an
encryption key. Red keys on the other hand are unencrypted and classified as
highly sensitive.
Figure 5. DF19 data format [45]
ATC. Spread spectrum techniques and cryptography could,
however, be a part of a future security approach to ADS-B
and will be discussed in this survey.
IV. SECURE BROADCAST AUTHENTICATION
Secure Broadcast Authentication is one possible means to
prevent and/or detect attacks in a unidirectional broadcast
network such as ADS-B. This section will describe the various
methods that have been proposed in the literature, typically
for wireless sensor networks or VANETs and analyse their
applicability to ADS-B.
Authentication of messages on a broadcast medium is
hard, compared to point-to-point communication. A symmetric
property is only useful in point-to-point authentication where
both parties trust each other. Thus, an asymmetric mechanism
is inherently required so that receivers can verify messages but
are not able to generate authentic messages themselves [46].
For a good overview over secure broadcast communication in
general, the reader is referred to [30].
The goal is to keep the open nature of ADS-B intact
while offering a potential authentication mechanism. This
could be done either globally or only selectively in cases
where suspicious behaviour has been detected. Such reactive
authentication could lessen the strain on the network by
only requiring additional security (and thus computational
and communicational overhead) at times when incidents seem
more likely.
Furthermore, there is a distinction between broadcast
schemes that are user-based vs. those that are node-based,
or possibly both. Node-based (also known as host-based)
schemes ensure the authenticity of a given node, i.e. the
hardware. User-based schemes on the other hand look to
authenticate a human user, regardless of the underlying
hardware [47]. This survey focuses mainly on node-based
schemes.
A. Non-Cryptographic Schemes on the Physical Layer
Non-cryptographic schemes such as fingerprinting comprise
various methods for wireless user authentication and device
identification techniques, either based on hardware or software
imperfections or characteristics of the wireless channel which
are hard to replicate. The goal is to identify suspicious activity
in a network. Finding a signature for legitimate beacons in
a network, possibly being able to tell apart ground stations
from aircraft, identifying the type of aircraft or even individual
machines provides data useful for the development of an in-
trusion detection system [48]. If there are tangible differences
between legitimate and non-legitimate packets on the physical
layer, then machine learning techniques could be employed to
develop a model for predictions of normal behaviour and also
statistical thresholds beyond which an activity is considered
8suspicious. Even if it is only feasible to identify classes of
devices instead of singular participants, this could prove to be
valuable information in detecting intruders. Yet, fingerprinting
does not provide surefire security in any way, and various
attacks and concerns have been brought forward [49].
Currently, there have been no attempts at applying any kind
of non-cryptographic schemes to boost the security of ADS-B.
A common counter-argument has been the fact that contrary
to e.g. the 802.11 markets the commercial airplane market is
divided into two big players (Boeing and Airbus) which in
the long run makes significant differences at least between
ADS-B vendors unlikely. Still, fingerprinting has also been
successfully employed to tell apart the exact same models from
the same vendor. For a good overview of the state of the art
in physical-layer identification of wireless devices, see [48].
Zeng et al. [50] broadly identified three different techniques
that can be employed to enhance or even replace traditional
cryptographic measures: Software, hardware and channel-
based fingerprinting.
a) Software-Based Fingerprinting: This type of
fingerprinting techniques tries to exploit distinctly different
patterns or behaviour of software operating on wireless
equipment. Depending on the specification of a protocol,
there is a lot of leeway for manufacturers and developers when
implementing software on a given device. If there is enough
entropy in information about the combination of chip sets,
firmware, drivers to tell apart different wireless users, this
approach can be used to verify their continuity up to a certain
degree. As a downside, it seems likely that large fleets of
airline operators are fitted with very similar or same hardware,
making them harder or even impossible to differentiate and on
the other hand easier to study and copy for a potential attacker.
b) Hardware-Based Fingerprinting: A number of tech-
niques have been proposed to identify devices based on unique
hardware differences. Some of these differences can be used
for radiometric fingerprinting, exploiting differences in the
turn-on/off transient (see, e.g., [51]) or the modulation of a
radio signal to build unique signatures. While this works well
for non-mobile cases and attackers with standard, off-the-shelf
hardware, it can break down against more powerful adver-
saries employing software defined radios and be subjected to
signal/feature replay attacks [48]. Furthermore, the existing
research captured signals very closely to the fingerprinting
antenna (15 m or less) and in non-mobile settings, making it
very improbable to work in the highly-dynamic, large-distance
ADS-B setting.
Another unique hardware feature amongst wireless devices
is clock skew. As no two clocks run precisely the same, this
can be used to create signatures and enable identification.
Unfortunately, to exploit this, we would require timestamps
included in ADS-B messages. Also, it is possible for an
attacker to eavesdrop on the communication and mimic the
appropriate clock skew [52].
Recently reviewed options for future systems include the
use of so-called physically unclonable functions (PUFs),
which essentially exploit specifically implemented circuits
to create unique and secure signatures, thus abandoning the
scope of non-cryptographic solutions.14 Furthermore, besides
requiring new hardware, this approach also necessitates
an overhauled messaging protocol, including a challenge
and response model [54], making it a difficult fit for the
requirements of the ADS-B protocol.
c) Channel/Location-Based Fingerprinting: Exploiting
natural characteristics of the physical layer has been a hot
research topic in relation with security in wireless networks.
Various approaches have shown that this can be a viable
alternative to more traditional authentication and verification
measures, typically based on received signal strength (RSS,
e.g. [55]), channel impulse response (CIR, e.g. [56]) or the
carrier phase (e.g. [57]). They are comparably easy to im-
plement in wireless systems and can offer reasonable security
without requiring much overhead.
Any such concept requires bidirectional communication,
however. One practical example is the retroactive authenti-
cation of data packets via an RSS list as proposed by Zeng et
al. [50]. As this temporal RSS variation authentication (TRVA)
requires an ACK packet in a given coherence time, it is not
compatible with current ADS-B protocols. Furthermore, it is
doubtful if this could work with reasonable efficiency in a
highly dynamic environment such as airborne MANETs. The
coherence time TC in which the channel stays stable in a
wireless network where only one sender moves at 800km/h is
roughly 0.6188ms. At a 1090ES bandwidth of 1 symbol/µs
it is obvious that such protocols are impossible to deploy.
This physical property also effectively denies the application
of many other more sophisticated physical-layer schemes such
as SecureAngle [58], which aims at securing wireless networks
by using multiple antennas capturing the angle of arrival
information of nodes to built signatures and detect anomalies.
Similarly, practical indoor location-based geo-tags, built with
surrounding radio frequency signals such as done in [59] are
not applicable.15
Laurendeau and Barbeau [60], [61] exploit RSS in a way
similar to time difference of arrival concepts (see V-A) to
localize malicious insiders in a vehicular ad hoc network with
the help of various receivers. Despite the fact that an attacker
will not be inclined to cooperate and can even actively fake
the signal strength he utilizes, their proposition enables the
receivers of a message to at least identify a given area where
it must have originated from.
d) Randomized/Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping /
Spreading: A physical-layer scheme different from finger-
printing, Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum (FHSS) and
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) are both used
in wireless systems to improve protection against malicious
narrow band and pulse jamming as well as eavesdropping. In
their usual form they both require a pre-shared spreading code
14For a good overview on PUFs, see [53]
15Although one advantage is that many legacy Mode S systems use
several directional rotating antennas to pick up ADS-B signals. The extracted
information about the angle-of-arrival could conceivably be used to raise red
flags, as described in Section V-F.
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Figure 6. Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping after [62]. Both A and
B regularly change their communication frequencies without having pre-
established a common pattern. By statistical chance they will communicate
on the same channel every so often.
or hopping pattern between sender and receiver which makes it
hard to follow or hinder the communication for anyone without
access to the code/pattern. This is also exploited in military
communications (see Section III-C) but is not a viable option
for world-wide civil and commercial ATC where such secret
codes would presumably not stay secret for long.
The need for a pre-established code can be relinquished
by employing random, uncoordinated versions of FHSS and
DSSS. Strasser et al. [62] propose such a physical layer
approach to counteract jamming in wireless broadcast sce-
narios. Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping (UFH) provides a
viable way to broadcast initial messages without an attacker
being able to jam the transmission in an efficient way. The
key insight to these approaches is that, contrary to normal
frequency hopping mechanisms, sender and receiver(s) rely on
the statistical chance to be on the same channel at the same
time. The obvious downside of UFH is its low bandwidth due
to the fact that many times receivers will not listen on the
correct channel. More concretely, the probability with UFH
that a packet will be received at a node without an attacker
being involved is pm ≥ 1 − (1 − csc )cr (c being the number
of possible channels, cs and cr the number of channels a
sender/receiver is using simultaneously).
Uncoordinated Direct-Sequence Spread Spectrum (UDSSS)
[63] and Randomized Differential DSSS [64] are techniques
based on the same principle. They rely on the statistical chance
that spread codes randomly chosen by sender and receiver(s)
will happen to be the same every so often.
While the proposed methods can effectively defeat jamming
and modification attacks, the inherently lower performance
and a prolonged transmission time make them difficult to
use in a large-scale system such as ADS-B. Furthermore,
authentication and security against replay attacks is only
achieved by adding a private/public key infrastructure and
timestamps, respectively.
B. Public Key Cryptography
Cryptographic measures have been a tried and tested means
to secure communication in wireless networks and must subse-
quently also be considered in the ADS-B setting. One question
to examine is if the current implementation of ADS-B can
be encrypted. The first possibility would be to distribute the
same encryption keys to all ADS-B participants worldwide,
or at least to aircraft and ground stations in a given area.
Such a vast group encryption scheme, including even general
aviation, would be considered extremely insecure to both
inside and outside attacks. This inherent weakness is non-
fixable even with very frequent key updates (which also would
again increase the complexity of the encryption deployment).
In short, such a scheme would fulfill none of the required
criteria listed in Section II-C. Finke et al. [65] examine
various encryption schemes, including the possibility to do
the key management for symmetric encryption out of band, for
example through the controller-pilot data link communication
(CPDLC) which they consider worth exploring further. The
authors also give an analysis of the security and practicability
of asymmetric, symmetric and format preserving encryption.
In their conclusion, they support a symmetric cipher using the
FFX algorithm (format-preserving, Feistel-based encryption
with multiple implementation variances) which can encrypt
non-standard block sizes (i.e. ADS-B’s 112 bit messages) with
sufficient entropy. However, the difficulties concerning key
management and distribution are strongly acknowledged. Most
recently, Wesson et al. [66] look at the broader question of
how to use encryption to secure ADS-B and conclude that the
problems with symmetric cryptography are too large to over-
come. They argue that PKI is the only feasible cryptographic
approach and propose ECDSA signatures as the smallest and
thus best solution. Besides the key management problem, they
further analyse the interference burden on the ADS-B channel,
showing that even without the significant additional traffic that
is currently found on the 1090 MHz frequency, the decrease
in operational capacity would potentially be crippling.
As mentioned before, if broadcast authentication is needed,
one requires an asymmetric property, a characteristic fulfilled
by public key cryptography. Samuelson and Valovage [67]
report on an implementation of authentication and encryption
in UAT using a public key infrastructure (PKI). Their method
uses a hash to create a message authentication code (MAC)
that can be used to authenticate the message and can be
extended to full encryption but no further details are publicly
available. There are related patents filed under the names
“Secure ADS-B Authentication System and Method” [68] and
“Automatic Dependent Surveillance System Secure ADS-S”
[69] by Sensis Corporation.16 The general idea is to use
a challenge/response format with an authenticator ground
station, who authenticates every participant in its reach and
notifies a higher authority and/or all other participants of
any failed authentication. This concept requires the station to
have access to a worldwide database of secure keys that is
both hard to maintain globally as well as subject to possible
security breaches. If this is the case, the system can be
used to not only identify ADS-B participants but also pilots
and various other people/systems taking part in the flight
process. Furthermore, ADS-S includes a changed modulation
and a complete overhaul of the messaging system, making
it incompatible with ADS-B and as such very costly and
extremely doubtful to be deployed widely in the future.
Costin et al. [6] suggest a “lightweight” PKI solution which
essentially amounts to a retroactive part publication of the
key as discussed in Section IV-C: Aircraft A transmits the
signature distributed over a number N of ADS-B messages, so
that after every N messages the surrounding participants have
received A’s signature. The recipients keep the messages until
16Now owned by defense contractor Saab AB.
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Figure 7. Outline of a potential public key infrastructure after [70]. A
PKI vendor supplies airlines, manufacturers and external suppliers with the
required certificates.
the full signature has been transmitted, at which point they
can authenticate the buffered messages. The authors suggest
that the PKI key distribution necessary for this scheme could
be done during an aircraft’s regular check-ups.
Ziliang et al. [71] present a concrete PKI solution for data
authentication in ADS-B/UAT based on Elliptic Curve Cipher
and X.509 certificates. The authors try to tackle a number
of problems involved with cryptography such as key size
length and keeping the broadcast nature of ADS-B. UAT offers
much longer messages than 1090ES, with payloads of 16 or
32 bytes when transmitted from aircraft and even 464 bytes
in ground message bursts [72]. Yet, their conclusion is that
the data block format needs to be changed, no matter which
type of cryptography is used. Consequently, they propose and
implement their authentication scheme with a slightly changed
UAT message type. In 1090ES, this scheme would require not
only using the DF24 Extended Length Messages available in
the Mode S standard but still need 5 messages to divide and
accommodate the signature data and timestamps, a solution
that hardly looks scalable in an already crowded frequency.
On top of this, the description leaves very much open the
question of an efficient certificate distribution scheme.
Raya and Hubaux [73], [74] discuss using Public Key
Cryptography in VANETs. The considered scenarios were
short-range with beacons sent every 100-300ms and included
up to 120 mobile nodes in a 300m communication range. They
looked at message sizes between 294 and 791 bytes and found
the performance to be acceptable in their simulations.
Figure 8. Example of a typical encryption scheme adapted for ADS-B from
[71]. It employs elliptic curve cryptography to generate signatures which can
be verified with the responding certificate by other aircraft and ground stations.
An additional GPS timestamp prevents replay attacks.
Robinson et al. [70] analyse various different solutions to
create PKI infrastructures for a general airplane assets distri-
bution system (AADS). Although, the work is not discussing
the ADS-B protocol but instead focuses on the distribution
of software and data on the ground, the authors identify
the airline industry’s needs and requirements from a PKI
infrastructure, and it seems plausible that the same system
could be used to secure air traffic control data. According to
their analysis, an ad hoc approach without a central authority,
employing pre-loaded trust certificates, could be used as a
short-term solution until a more structured, long-term public
key infrastructure has been developed (see Fig. 7 for an outline
of their proposal).
The obvious idea for a centralised key distribution would
be to have aviation authorities such as the FAA act as a
certificate authority (CA). But assuming the role of a CA
is no easy task. Even many specialized institutions had to
report numerous security breaches over the last decades.
Furthermore, if this problem is sufficiently solved, there
remains the question of how aircraft from airspaces mandated
by different authorities can securely communicate with each
other. These challenges are somewhat analog to the same
approach in vehicular networks as discussed in [75] but
arguable even worse due to the large internationalization of
the ADS-B network.
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There are certain natural disadvantages to using an encryp-
tion solution that cannot be overcome (or only with great
difficulty) as mentioned in [76]:
• Despite the encryption of data frames, management and
control frames are not protected.
• It immediately and unmitigatably breaks compatibility
with the installed base.
• Key exchange is notoriously difficult in ad hoc networks,
which are by definition without a centralized institution.
They are often too dynamic, requiring constant adapta-
tion. This would result in too much overhead in both the
number and the size of messages.
• The open nature of ADS-B is widely seen as a feature. A
cryptographic system implemented in a way comparable
to ADS-S does not offer public broadcast communication.
• One-time signatures even using advanced techniques such
as Merkle-Winternitz prove infeasible due to their over-
head of 80 bytes and more, simply to sign 60 bits [46].
To conclude this section, it is difficult to build any kind of
encryption scheme with the currently standardized 1090ES
data link. Approaches have been shown to be theoretically
possible with the higher bandwidth UAT, although practical
proof of scalability and practicability have not been given
yet. Furthermore, at this point in time it does not seem likely
that UAT will play a role apart from general aviation in the
FAA-mandated airspace. So, while UAT offers more technical
possibilities not only for security and encryption, and even
combined UAT/1090ES transmitters are neither a technical nor
a regulatory problem,17 traditional cryptography in conjunction
with the current installment of ADS-B seems to be a very
difficult route for further research at the present.
C. Retroactive Key Publication
A variation on traditional asymmetric cryptography is the
technique of having senders retroactively publish their keys
which are then used by receivers to authenticate the broadcast
messages. This approach that has been proposed for use in
various fields [30], [77]. The key concept is simple: Any
broadcasting entity produces an encrypted message authentica-
tion code (MAC) which is then sent along with every message.
After a set amount of time or messages, the key to decrypt this
MAC is published. All listening receivers, who have buffered
the previous messages, can now decrypt the messages and
ensure the continuity of the sender over time.
The TESLA (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authen-
tication) protocol [78], standardized in RFC 4082,18 can pro-
vide efficient broadcast authentication on a large scale, while it
is able to cope with packet loss and real-time applications. The
µTESLA broadcast authentication protocol is the adaptation of
TESLA for wireless sensor networks [79].
17“There is nothing in the regulations and there are no technical hur-
dles that would prevent a manufacturer from building a combination
UAT/1090ES box, one that would eliminate the different-technology blind
spots while allowing high-flying aircraft the ability to get FIS-B through UAT.”
http://www.flyingmag.com/technique/proficiency/ins-and-outs-ads-b
18“Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication
(TESLA): Multicast Source Authentication Transform Introduction”,
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4082.txt
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Figure 9. The figure illustrates TESLA’s utilization of one-way chains after
[78]. The first one-way function F generates the chain, following that the
second one-way function F ′ derives the MAC keys. Time is divided into
separate intervals i, all having the same length. The packets Pj are each sent
during one specific interval. For every such packet, the sender computes a
MAC with the key that is in accordance with that interval. E.g. Pj+2’s MAC
is calculated based on its data and key K′i. Disclosing the keys of previous
intervals can be done either by attaching the key to sent packets or in separate
messages.
Both TESLA and µTESLA use one-way key chains as
shown in Fig. 9: The broadcaster chooses a random key Kn
and applies a public pseudo-random function F as often as
required to acquire the keys: Ki = F (Ki+1), 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
Subsequently, every secret Ki, i > 0 is used for sending in
the i-th interval and disclosed to the public after a number
of time intervals d. As every previous key Ki with i < j
can be recovered by the receiver(s) by applying the one-way
function F , the receiver needs to do two things to authenticate
a message: [80]
1) Authenticate the key Ki against previously received keys
to ensure they are from the same key chain.
2) Ensure that the message with key Ki could only have
been sent before the key has been published (requiring
loose time synchronization), i.e. before interval i+ d.
The fact that µTESLA uses symmetric cryptography in
connection with time as its asymmetric property makes it an
interesting idea for adaptation to ADS-B since a sufficiently
good time synchronization could be provided via GPS (this
would require sending the GPS timestamps in a new protocol
field since this is not currently the case). The advantages of
µTESLA are obvious: ADS-B keeps its open and broadcast
nature and a complex PKI infrastructure is not required to
ensure a sender’s continuity, although it could be added if
identification and source integrity are required (e.g. solely
for well-connected ground stations). Nonetheless, it enables
a participant to protect itself against impersonation attacks. In
areas well-served by ground stations any break in continuity
detected by any single one of them would set off red flags.
Another advantage of µTESLA is that lost packets on
the notoriously jammed 1090 MHz frequency (there is no
medium access control in place) are not an integral problem for
authentication. Furthermore, the overhead for communication
as well as required modifications to the ADS-B protocol
are significantly less than with traditional asymmetric cryp-
tographic methods.19
19 The original µTESLA requires a 6 byte MAC.
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Figure 10. TESLA signatures vs. ECDSA signatures. Tesla signatures cost
significantly less overhead compared to many other cryptographic solutions.
On the other hand, µTESLA also has some disadvantages
when applying it to AANETs. There is a need to reinitialize it
(if used for identification) and it can be susceptible to memory-
based DoS (depending on the setup of the receiver). To counter
this, Eldefrawy et al. [81] propose an approach that utilizes
forward hashing using two different nested hashes and the
Chinese Reminder Theorem, resulting in a system that does
not need to be reinitialized.
Haas and Yu [82] compare TESLA and ECDSA-based
authentication by simulating their performance in a real-
world VANET scenario (although not including certificate
distribution). Regarding channel congestion and MAC layer
delay, they found that the TESLA protocol with keys attached
to a subsequent broadcast performed significantly better than
ECDSA or a TESLA-scheme that publishes keys in separate
packets.
Hu and Laberteaux [83] discuss a combination of a
full-blown PKI infrastructure with CAs distributing 512
bit signatures to bootstrap 80 bit TESLA signatures for
short-term authentication in VANETs. Such a system offers
comparably lightweight integrity and possibly on-demand
authentication, if needed and requested.
V. SECURE LOCATION VERIFICATION
Besides securing the communication - and thus the location
data - of ADS-B, there are other approaches to ensure the
integrity of air traffic management. The general idea of secure
location verification is to double check the authenticity of
location claims made by aircraft and other ADS-B participants.
This is inherently different from the verification of the broad-
cast sources and messages. The baseline is to establish means
to find the precise location of a sender, effectively offering
some redundancy and thus the ability to double check any
claims made. As an additional advantage any such approach
creates more location data, which can be merged with ADS-
B and radar and offer a back-up system in case of failure of
these primary navigation systems or GPS.
A. Multilateration
Multilateration, or hyperbolic positioning, is a popular form
of co-operative independent surveillance and has been suc-
cessfully employed for decades in military and civil appli-
cations. If the precise distance between four or more known
locations and an unidentified location can be established, it is
a purely geometric task to find the unknown point. We can,
for example, use the received ADS-B signals which travel at
the speed of light to estimate the distance. Since we do not
know the absolute time a message needed to travel from an
Figure 11. Intersection of three hyperboloids from [87]. With four receivers
in a 3D setting, one can specify the origin of the message as the red point
where the computed hyperboloids intersect.
airplane to a receiver, we have to employ the time difference
of arrival (TDOA).20
Thus, multilateration requires a number of antennas in
different locations that receive the same signal at different
times. From the TDOA, hyperboloids can be calculated on
which the aircraft’s position must lie. With four or more
receivers, a 3D position can be estimated by finding the
intersection of the hyperbolas as shown in Fig. 11.
Performing multilateration by utilizing TDOA is currently
the preferred solution for location verification on the ground. It
is used in the field (e.g. by the ASDE-X system [88]) at various
US airports21 and also being rolled out in Europe in connection
with the CASCADE project.22 One major advantage of multi-
lateration is the fact that it can utilize aircraft communication
that is already in place. Thus, there are no changes required
to the currently existing infrastructure in aircraft, while on the
ground receiver stations and central processing stations have
to be deployed (see Fig. 12).
While currently used mainly in comparably short distances
(taxiway and runway on airports, up to about 60 m height),
Wide Area Multilateration (WAMLAT) has also been a popular
research topic. Compared to primary radar systems, WAMLAT
is relatively easy and cost-effective to install and use on the
ground but can also be successfully employed in an airborne
MANET.23 Using an estimated distance of a target between
four or more receivers, it is possible to tell the 3D position
20For a full explanation of the multilateration process in aviation see e.g.
[84] or [85]. For an overview over wireless location techniques, see [86].
21See the manufacturer’s description: http://www.saabsensis.com/docs/128/
22http://www.cascade-eu.org
23Although vast open spaces such as found in e.g. Australia or over oceans
can prove infeasible for the use of multilateration and have been one of the
very reasons driving the development and deployment of ADS-B.
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Figure 12. Basic multilateration architecture. Four (or more) receiver stations
measure the time at which they receive the same message from an aircraft.
They send this data to the central processing station which can calculate the
aircraft’s position from the time difference of arrival between the receiver
stations.
of a sender with roughly 30 m accuracy (at 90 NM distance)
compared to 20 m for ADS-B [24]. However, in comparison to
ADS-B the accuracy of multilateration in practice deteriorates
over long distances (see Fig. 13).
There have been various practical studies of multilateration
using ADS-B signals. For example, [14] examines it as a
method to provide a means to backup and validate ADS-B
communication. Johnson et al. [89] describe their proof of
concept work in a war-zone in Afghanistan. Kaune et al. [90]
built a proprietary low cost test bed to do multilateration
with ADS-B signals. Thomas [91] presents findings from two
controlled helicopter flights in the North Sea.
Daskalakis and Martone [92] give a technical assessment of
the possibility of using ADS-B and WAMLAT in the Gulf of
Mexico, testing a single controlled flight with good accuracy.
A recent work at MITRE Corporation [93] analyzes the at-
tempt to build an alternative navigation system with WAMLAT
in the FAA-mandated US airspace. The authors discuss the
potential use of already deployed sensors for multilateration
around three airports with flat terrain, also noting that the
challenge is greater in more mountainous areas. Further, they
provide some sensor placement discussion, determining the
optimal choice and number from a given database concerning
requirements such as accuracy and low dilution of precision.
Despite its successful use in the field, multilateration leaves
a number of open problems in terms of secure location
verification, for example the estimation of aircraft altitudes
with ground-based receivers is known to be very difficult.
Galati et al. [94] discuss the theoretical application of SSR
as the basis for multilateration in airport surveillance. They
analyze a case study of the Marco Polo airport in Venice
and look at technical details such as dilution of precision and
multilateration algorithms and conduct simulations with five
sensors in a 25 km radius around the airport. They propose
angle-of-arrival measurements to improve the unsatisfying
height estimates provided by the wide area multilateration.
The International Civil Aviation Organization also names a
few known drawbacks of multilateration: [41]
1) It is susceptible to multi-path propagation.
2) A signal has to be correctly detected at comparably
many receiving stations.
3) A separate link between the central processing station
and all receivers is required.
Figure 13. Comparison of location estimation accuracies when utilizing
primary radar, wide area multilateration and ADS-B [14]. SACp denotes the
Surveillance Accuracy Category for Position as defined in [14].
Essentially, some of the limitations stem from cost and logistic
reasons as it can be difficult and expensive to deploy enough
sensors and stations in very remote and inaccessible areas.
Furthermore, [69] mentions an attack vector for an adver-
sary trying to fool a receiver system utilizing multilateration
for location verification. An attacker would need to purchase
and modify four traffic-collision avoidance system (TCAS)
receivers and use a GPS/WAAS time transfer unit between
the units to ensure relative timing accuracy. Furthermore, he
needs to engineer an algorithm similar to the one TCAS
uses to determine aircraft’s tracks. As this involves both a
certain cost and non-zero engineering knowledge the difficulty
of exploiting this threat is relatively high, certainly when
compared with the simplicity of spoofing ADS-B messages.
In principle, there always remains the question of how to
secure the communication needed to perform multilateration
and relay the localisation information to the other participants.
If it is not properly secured, Sybil attacks, where a number
of dishonest nodes deceive their environment, are entirely
possible [95].
B. Distance Bounding
Distance bounding is another method that has been em-
ployed in wireless networks to partly localize other partici-
pants and ensure secure transactions e.g. for RFID communi-
cation. First presented by Brands and Chaum in 1993 [96], the
idea behind distance bounding is to establish a cryptographic
protocol with the goal to have a prover P show to a verifier
V that P is within a certain physical distance (see Fig. 15 for
the concrete protocol). The universally valid fact that electro-
magnetic waves travel roughly at the speed of light c, but
never faster, builds the foundation of all distance bounding
protocols.24 This enables the computation of a distance based
on the time of flight between the verifier’s challenge and the
corresponding response by the prover. The determined distance
serves as an upper-bound, an additional piece of information
that can subsequently be used as a means to verify and
24This is in contrast to e.g. distance estimation via received signal strength,
which can be influenced and faked by a malicious node.
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Figure 14. Principle of distance bounding protocols. The verifier V sends
a challenge to the prover P who then, after processing, sends his response
(black dashed arrows). A man in the middle (V ′/P ′) can only increase the
distance by adding further processing delays, but not decrease it (red arrows).
αi ∈R {0, 1} mi ∈R {0, 1}
commit(m1|...|mb)
Start of rapid bit exchange, repeat b times.
αi
βi βi ← αi ⊕mi
End of rapid bit exchange.
(open commit), sign(m)
m← αi|βi|...|αb|βbm← αi|βi|...|αb|βb
verify commit
verify sign(m)
A B
Figure 15. Original untrusting distance bounding protocol by Chaum and
Brands [96]. A is the verifier, B the prover. After the protocol exchange A
can verify that B is within a given distance.
authenticate a node by checking the truth of its claims. When
distance-bounding is performed by various trusted entities
(such as ground stations) these can collaborate and find the
actual location of the prover via trilateration.25 There are
various practical attacks on distance bounding schemes given
in the literature, among them a number of relay attacks such
as the so-called distance fraud, mafia fraud and terrorist fraud
[97] as well as the newer distance hijacking attack [98].
Consequently, an abundance of protocols have been sug-
gested to deal with these various deficiencies. Song et al. [99]
give an example of a secure distance bounding mechanism for
VANETs, comprising of three steps:
1) Traditional distance bounding is used to find the lower
bound of the distance between V and P . P can only
increase the time to respond to V ’s challenge and as
such only appear further away than it really is.
2) The verifier then checks the claimed location of P for
plausibility (also see Section V-F):
a) Transmission range-based verification: There are
limits on the maximum distance of wireless trans-
25Triangulation is not to be confused with the previously described multilat-
eration. The former uses the absolute measurements of three or more distance
circles to determine positions, while the latter uses the difference in distance
between the measurements.
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Figure 16. Network topology for a minimum distance guarantee after [99]. V
is the verifier, P the prover, P ′ its claimed location. B is a common neighbour
of both V and P who gives an estimate E of P ’s position. Considering the
ellipse and a certain error distance, B can detect the distance enlargement of
P .
mission in practice. Test runs can help to find prac-
tical upper bounds for ADS-B users in a certain
location/path. If the prover claims to be further
away, it can be considered malicious.
b) Speed-based verification: Considering the fact that
the typical speed of a given airplane in differing
flight stages is known (certainly the physically
possible minimum and maximum velocity), con-
secutive position claims have to be in a given
window.
3) To further improve the security, after all plausibility
checks have been passed, the verifier chooses a common
neighbour B. That neighbour of both P and V then gives
its location estimation E for P as shown in Fig. 16.
Whenever the estimate lies outside the error margin, B
knows that P enlarged its distance.
Chiang et al. [100], [101] develop a secure multilateration
scheme based on distance bounding that, under idealized
assumptions, can detect false location claims with a high
rate of success. By also taking into account RSS differences,
they can mitigate distance enlargement attacks and generic
collusion attacks on the protocol. This shows how different
physical layer techniques can be combined to improve theo-
retical security, however, the practical challenges in using such
protocols in ATC are difficult to solve.
While in the literature distance bounding has been used
mostly for close-up, indoor communication, it has been mod-
eled for use in VANETs up to a distance of 225 m between
prover and verifier [99], [102]. Tippenhauer and Capkun [103]
also considered the impact of moving targets on distance
bounding protocols and verifiable multilateration. In their
original implementation, it takes about 600ms to perform a
full localization, which, at a speed of only 500 km/h means
that a target already moves 75 m during the process. The
authors propose Kalman filters (see Section V-C) to smoothly
keep track of the prover’s location and detect any malicious
tampering by outsiders.
Besides its current unsuitability for the long distances and
high velocities present in air-traffic control, another main
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Figure 17. Basic concept of Kalman filtering from [105]. The time
update step projects the measured variables and the error covariances. The
measurement update step computes the Kalman gain and updates the estimates
and error covariances with the actual measurements.
disadvantage of distance bounding is the fact that it inherently
requires a response by the prover to the verifier’s challenge
and thus from an ADS-B point of view enforces an entirely
new protocol paradigm. As an additional, on-demand feature
it could still provide crucial information about the legitimacy
of nodes in areas where PSR is not present (or is phased out
due to cost reasons).
C. Kalman Filtering and Intent Verification
Kalman filters (also known under the technical term linear
quadratic estimation) [104] have already seen extensive use
in broader ATC applications, e.g. to filter and smoothen GPS
position data in messages. Kalman filtering is used to observe
noisy time series of measurements and tries to statistically
optimally predict future states of the measured variables of
the underlying system.
A high level overview of the Kalman filtering algorithm
comprises two distinct steps, a prediction step and an update
step (see Fig. 17). As the procedure is recursive it can easily
be used and updated in real time, without having to save more
than the last state.
• Prediction step: In the first step, the current state variables
are predicted as well as the connected uncertainties.
• Update step: For every following step, the previously
obtained estimates are then updated with a weighted
average. During this process, the estimates with higher
certainty are assigned higher weight.
The theory behind Kalman filtering requires the observed
system to be linear and the underlying measuring variables and
errors to follow a normal distribution, although there have been
developments to adapt the approach to non-linear systems.
Kalman filtering plays a crucial role in the multilateration
approach, sorting out noisy signals and smoothing over miss-
ing data (Fig. 18). It is also a useful tool in general to predict
the future values of a feature based on collected historical
data. More concretely, it is used in ground systems to filter
and verify the state vectors and trajectory changes reported by
ADS-B aircraft and conduct plausibility checks on these data
[106]. Krozel et al. [107] go on further to verify the intent
of the aircraft by first defining local and global correlation
Figure 18. Example of Kalman filtering from [107]. Noisy signals are being
smoothed (left), dropped data being coasted over below a given cutoff point
(right).
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Figure 19. Practical application of intent verification in ADS-B from [107].
The example analyzes the horizontal aircraft motion with a global correlation
function as a moving window over local correlation functions.
functions to evaluate the correlation between aircraft motions
and the ADS-B intent (Fig. 17). Then the authors compute
geometric conformance, i.e. if the aircraft is in given horizontal
and vertical limits and intent conformance, i.e. analyzing the
aircraft motion and comparing it to a plausible intent model
in several dimensions (in this case horizontal, vertical and
velocity).
Kovell et al. [36] note that since Kalman filtering is used in a
number of ADS-B related systems, it is essential to distinguish
between Kalman filters dealing with an aircraft’s GPS position,
with received signal strength of packets and the angle of arrival
at a recipient’s antenna and their proposed use for real time
positional claim verifications of an aircraft onboard of other
aircraft. Kalman filtering of positional claims is slightly more
difficult in aircraft-to-aircraft systems but there are no inherent
impossible obstacles to it.
From an attacker’s point of view, Kalman filters can be
tricked by a so-called frog boiling attack [108]: The adversary
is jamming the correct signal, while continuously transmitting
an ever-so-slightly modified position. If this is done slowly
enough, the Kalman filter will see the injected data as a
valid trajectory change. This exposes a general weakness of
Kalman filtering as the approach is based on comparatively
little historical data. But it is still of great use since obviously
bogus manoeuvres, speeds, features can be detected (see also
Section V-F) and the complexity of any attack is greatly
increased. Another general downside is that it opens up more
DoS-possibilities due to the largely increased computational
complexity at every receiver, although this is not a major
problem with comparably powerful installations in ground
stations and airplanes. A possible threshold time after which
sufficient trust has been established between two participants
based Kalman filtering is still open research [36].
D. Group Verification
Group verification is another concept proposed to mitigate
security and privacy concerns over the use of ADS-B [34]. It
aims at securing the airborne ADS-B IN communication by
employing multilateration done by a group to verify location
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Figure 20. Illustration of the group concept from [34]. Four or more aircraft
V are in any group G. Each group then can internally use multilateration to
verify each other’s location claims as well as those of outsiders in range. r0 is
the wireless communication range, 0.5r0 considered geographically proximate
and thus acceptable for group establishment, given sufficient communication
quality. To lower group overhead, the region of interest for a group can be
restricted to rgroup.
claims of non-group members in-flight. A given authenticated
group with 4 or more aircraft having established trust can com-
municate with each other to utilize multilateration (based on
TDOA or RSS) just as ground stations can (see Section V-A).
If a forged position report is detected, the sensible reaction
would be to increase the circle of avoidance around nearby
airplanes since their position cannot anymore be regarded as
precisely known and thus safe.
Kovell et al. [36] conducted a study about the applicability
of the group concept in commercial aviation in the United
States airspace. Examining the vast differences in traffic den-
sity over the US, they found that around 91% of aircraft at
a given time could be part of a sufficiently large group of 4
aircraft or more.
Group verification has a number of downsides. First of
all, it requires many additional messages to implement the
verification and trust process. As ADS-B is purely unidirec-
tional broadcast, a new protocol is needed to support the
group concept. Concerning the question of which protocol
to use, the authors mention the L-Band Digital Aeronautical
Communication System (L-DACS) as one possibility. L-DACS
is being developed by EUROCONTROL as a future IP tech-
nology for air-to-air communication but unfortunately there
is no specification in sight in the medium term.26 If such a
protocol can be successfully implemented, there remains the
central problem of how to manage the secure authentication
of members that are to be accepted into the group in the
first place. It is very complicated to establish trust in new
groups of MANETs and to reliably avoid malicious aircraft.
Furthermore, the performance of the system in reaction to
intelligent intentional jamming of some or all communication
would have to be considered.
On the other hand, even without a perfectly secure solution,
the group concept would raise the difficulty and engineering
effort of certain airborne attacks by orders of magnitude.
26“In addition to the air/ground capability, some of the assessed
technologies could also support additional features such as air/air
(point to point and/or broadcast) communications and digital voice.
However the support of these capabilities needs further investigation.”
http://www.eurocontrol.int/communications/public/standard_page/LDACS.html
E. Data Fusion and Trust Management
Data fusion is quickly becoming a cornerstone of modern
intelligent transport systems (ITS). The concept can be used at
various stages of data processing, Baud et al. [109], for exam-
ple, describe the fusion of radar and ADS-B data and show that
this approach can improve the quality of tracking in practice.
Concerning ADS-B security, the literature proposes to check
positional data obtained from within the system against data
coming in from other, independent sources. Adequate data can
e.g. stem from multilateration (see Section V-A), traditional
primary radar systems or even flight plan data. Liu et al. [110]
describe a hybrid estimation algorithm to fuse multiple sensors
with different surveillance techniques (PSR, SSR, multilatera-
tion) and flight plan information together, not specifically for
security purposes but general fault detection.
Such verification can provide a way of knowing if some
of the involved systems work outside normal parameters, be
it from a malicious source or not. Subsequently, automated
technical or non-technical procedures can be carried out,
identifying the problem and reacting accordingly. This process
comprises an analysis of the trust-worthiness of the data, if it
has been vulnerable to tampering depending on the system
and the precision/measurement uncertainty of the respective
technologies (as given e.g. in [14]). The trust-worthiness can
then be calculated by looking at the correlations and further
features deduced through machine learning processes which
aim to expose anomalies in received information and thus to
enable more automated detection of attacks.
An example of this is given in [111]. The authors use the
cosine similarity between claimed and estimated positions to
judge the trustworthiness of a participant’s claims and maintain
historical beacon trust information:
SimCos(~E, ~O) =
~E · ~O
|~E| · |~O|
=
xE × xO + yE ×+vE × vO√
x2
E
+ y2
O
+ v2
E
×
√
x2
O
+ y2
O
+ v2
O
(1)
where xO, yO are the coordinates, vO the velocity as
claimed in the last received message and xE , yE are the
estimated coordinates of the claimant, based on the previously
received message. As a further step they calculate the time-
based weighted trustworthiness of a beacon message, taking
into account the cosine similarity of the last I beacon messages
and their respective estimates:
Tbeacon =
∑I
i=1
SimCos(~E, ~O)(wi)
n∑I
i=1
(wi)n
(2)
It is easy to make a case for data fusion, since many of
the required components are already available and a two-out-
of-three (2oo3) approach is a widely accepted best practice
in many industries dealing with processes that are crucial to
safety and security. It has even been suggested to equip the
average car with primary surveillance radar, to secure vehicular
ad hoc networks [112].
There are already a number of integrated systems being
deployed (such as ASDE-X) that are inherently fusing the
data of various sub-systems (ADS-B, multilateration, flight
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Figure 21. Example of an RSS heat map used for traffic modeling from [9].
The colors indicate the received signal strength at a single measuring point
which correlates strongly with the distance. Though it is relatively easy for
an attacker to manipulate the RSS, it becomes increasingly difficult the more
measuring points have to be deceived.
plan information, radar data) to increase both security and
accuracy in airport proximity. An exemplary patent for a
data fusion apparatus looking to improve ADS-B security
can be found in [113]. The clear advantage of data fusion
is the compatibility with legacy systems, including the fact
that the ADS-B protocol does not need to be amended to
provide these additional features. The downsides include
increased cost for additional systems to provide the necessary
redundancy.
F. Traffic Modeling and Plausibility Checks
Traffic modeling could provide a mechanism to detect devi-
ations from normal ADS-B behaviour. By utilizing historical
data as well as machine learning methods it is possible to
create a model of a map for each ground station, providing a
means to verify location claims made by aircraft via ADS-B.
Figure 21 shows how a typical heat map based on RSS values
looks from the point of view of a ground station. Such models
can provide hints about non-matching location claims of a
message send by an aircraft. Other potential considerations
include checking for a certain number of consecutive packets
of the same - or different - aircraft with the same RSS/angle-
of-arrival, or otherwise suspicious absolute values which could
indicate a stationary, ground-based attacker (e.g. RSS/AoA
values outside typically observed thresholds).
Xiao et al. [114] used a similar statistical approach for
the detection of Sybil nodes in VANETs. They propose an
algorithm that could be performed by any node that has
received enough measurements of e.g. signal strength from
nearby witnesses. While a single estimated position of a node
may not be an accurate representation of the real location, a
larger sample of estimated positions would have to be very
similar to the node’s position claims over a given period of
time.
More formally, if in a period ∆to there are n sequential po-
sitions l1, ..., ln claimed by an airplane with the corresponding
estimated positions l
′
1, ..., l
′
n, then the difference between the
two can be treated as a random error. That means that a large
enough sample of differences is distributed normally with a
mean µd and a variance σ20 . If these hypotheses are true, then
it can be assumed that the claimant has given valid positional
reports within the chosen level of significance (see [114] for
further explanations and simulation results in VANETs). As
this method is only practical for fixed receivers, the goal is
to use ground stations to detect unusual behaviour, which are
also more likely to be able to collect enough samples to make
the verification process as sound as possible.
On top of this, there are numerous comparably simple rules
that can be utilized as potential red flags by an intrusion
detection system without resorting to more complex mea-
sures. Neither of these rules are necessary nor sufficient by
themselves to detect an ongoing attack. But depending on the
scenario and the attacker’s savvy, they can indicate unusual
behaviour that should be further investigated either by a human
or handled through additional technical means. For example, it
is very plausible to outright drop a number of packets where
either the data or the meta data is technically or physically
impossible. Doing so can significantly reduce the strain on
the ADS-B system and even prevent both spoofing and DoS
attacks which are not crafted carefully enough. If a large
number of potential red flags are checked for an intrusion
detection system, not only the risk for an attacker to cause an
alert increases significantly, but also the cost and complexity of
an attack rise. While this does not constitute theoretical perfect
security, plausibility checks can be very useful in practice.
Mitigating factors exist across various layers, from the
physical to the application. Some are available to ground
stations/air traffic control only, others also to aircraft-to-
aircraft (A2A) ADS-B IN communication. Such cases include
but are not limited to [115]:
• Investigating airplanes which suddenly appear well
within the maximum communication range of a receiver.
• Dropping aircraft which are violating a given accep-
tance range threshold, producing impossible locations.
• Aircraft violating a given mobility grade threshold,
producing impossible minimum or maximum velocities.
• Maximum Density Threshold: If too many aircraft are
in a given area, ATC software will typically alarm the
user.
• Map-based Verification: Aircraft in unusual places such
as no-fly areas or outside typical airways (this might
possibly be better handled at the ATC software layer).
• Flight plan-based Verification: Flooded/attacked ground
stations are able to check ADS-B messages against the
existing flight plan.
• Obvious discontinuities in one of the 9 ADS-B state
vector data fields (also see the related Section V-C) .
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As explained before, such potential red flags need to be
handled with utmost care and typically they can not be
automated but require much additional scrutiny before any
action is taken (e.g., the packet/flight is considered an attack
and dropped from ATC monitors). Yet, they also enable
the opportunity to follow up and activate further means to
secure the airspace. For example, when using such centralized
detection at the ground stations, these same stations could
then destroy messages sent by the detected offenders as
outlined in [116], [117].
VI. SUMMARY
The Tables III-V provide a compact overview over the
effectiveness of all examined solutions in combating the var-
ious proposed attacks as well as in offering advantages and
disadvantages concerning the feasibility to implement each
approach in the real world. As it has been laid out, there
is no single optimal or even good solution when considering
means that have no or little impact on the currently employed
ADS-B software and hardware. Table III shows the attacks
the discussed approaches can counteract. We see that most
security schemes focus on attacks of the message injec-
tion/modification class. This has two main reasons that have
been mentioned throughout this survey: First of all, the open
nature of ADS-B has been considered a desirable feature in
most scenarios. So unless there is a major paradigm shift in the
way air traffic communication and control is handled currently,
there is no interest in protecting against passive listeners, de-
spite this being the first stepping stone for more sophisticated
and problematic attacks. Second, passive attacks such as eaves-
dropping are simply much more difficult to protect against
without having a full cryptographic solution. Similarly, attacks
on the physical layer, such as continuously jamming the well-
known frequency or the more surgical message deletion are
hard to defend against, with measures on the same layer
(e.g. uncoordinated spread spectrum) providing some of the
only approaches to this general wireless security problem. All
discussed approaches do however address message insertion
and tampering, either by protecting outright against it through
verification (cryptographic methods) or by detecting anomalies
in the data (e.g. Kalman filtering, multilateration).
Table IV takes a look at the security features the dis-
cussed schemes can provide. As discussed before, only a
full cryptographic public key infrastructure can guarantee the
integrity of received data. All other approaches either aim to
secure the integrity of the source (e.g. µTESLA, many of
the discussed physical layer schemes) or seek to verify the
provided location data independently. Additional protection
against flood denial of service attacks against ATC systems
can be directly provided by spread spectrum approaches and
cryptography, while other methods rely on higher layers to
sort out false aircraft claims.
Table V provides an overview over the feasibility of the dif-
ferent approaches in practical settings, especially considering
the current state of air traffic control in the aviation industry.
As is to be expected, the difficulty and cost columns are mostly
Injection /
Modification
Eavesdropping Jamming /
Deletion
Physical Layer
Authentication
+ - -
Uncoordinated
Spread Spectrum
- + +
(Lightweight) PKI + + -
µTESLA + - -
Wide Area
Multilateration
+ - -
Distance Bounding + - -
Kalman Filtering + - -
Group Verification + - -
Data Fusion + - -
Traffic Modeling + - -
Table III
OVERVIEW OF CAPABILITIES OF VARIOUS SECURITY APPROACHES
AGAINST FEASIBLE ATTACKS ON ADS-B.
Data
Integrity
Source
Integrity
Location
Integrity
DoS
Physical Layer
Authentication
No Yes Possibly Partly
Uncoordinated
Spread Spectrum
No No No Yes
(Lightweight) PKI Yes Yes Yes Partly
µTESLA No Yes No No
Wide Area
Multilateration
No No Yes No
Distance Bounding No No Partly No
Kalman Filtering No Partly Partly No
Group Verification No Possibly Yes No
Data Fusion No Partly Yes Backup
Traffic Modeling No No Yes No
Table IV
OVERVIEW OF SECURITY FEATURES OF VARIOUS APPROACHES FOR USE
WITH ADS-B.
correlated. The difficulty to overcome technical challenges
is particularly high for distance bounding, which is yet in
its beginnings and a full-blown public key infrastructure. In
contrast, we see wide-area multilateration, Kalman filters and
data fusion techniques already in use in the field. This naturally
translates to the cost factor which plays an important role in
industry decisions. One can choose between a completely new
protocol which addresses the security question better than the
current installment of ADS-B does, slight modifications such
as new message types, or a transparent, parallel system which
requires new software and/or new hardware in different scales.
This touches also on the question of scalability. For example,
the fusion of various ATC systems and their data (PSR, SSR,
ADS-C, WAMLAT, FANS) is an obvious and necessary idea.
Yet, it is common knowledge in the aviation community that
a “major part of the business case for Automatic Dependent
Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) is attributed to the savings
generated by decommissioning or reducing reliance on con-
ventional radar systems“ [14]. Thus, it seems inefficient and
unlikely to have legacy and/or new backup systems around
on a broad scale, simply to fix the inadequateness of ADS-B
related to security.
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Difficulty Cost Scalability Compatibility References
Physical Layer
Authentication
Variable Variable Variable Requires additional
hard-/software. No modifications
to the ADS-B protocol.
[48]–[61]
Uncoordinated
Spread Spectrum
Medium Medium Medium Requires new hardware and a new
physical layer.
[62]–[64]
(Lightweight) PKI High High Medium Distribution infrastructure and
changes in protocol and message
handling needed.
[6], [65]–[71], [73]–[76]
µTESLA Medium Medium High New message type required for
key publishing, MAC added.
[30], [77]–[83]
Wide Area
Multilateration
Low Medium Medium No change to ADS-B required.
Separate hardware system.
[14], [24], [84], [85],
[89]–[94]
Distance Bounding High Medium Low New messages and protocol
needed.
[96], [99]–[103]
Kalman Filtering Low Low High No additional messages needed.
Separate software system.
[36], [104]–[107]
Group Verification High Medium Low New messages and protocol
needed.
[34], [36]
Data Fusion Low Medium -
High
Medium No change in ADS-B required.
Separate system.
[109]–[113]
Traffic Modeling Medium Low High Additional, separate entities for
ground stations needed.
[9], [114], [115]
Table V
OVERVIEW OF FEASIBILITY ATTRIBUTES OF VARIOUS APPROACHES FOR USE WITH ADS-B.
Future Research Directions
Considering the fact that the invention, certification and
large-scale deployment of air-traffic systems takes decades,
as currently seen in the example of ADS-B, it seems equally
non-sensible to present a completely overhauled ATC-system
at this point in time. Yet, future aviation protocol development
is important as there will eventually be a successor to ADS-B
and the responsible community must learn from the ADS-B
case study. Authentication should be considered right from
the beginning when planning new protocols, this includes
choosing the right cryptographic primitives, an appropriate
communication pattern considering A2A and ground stations,
and, most importantly, a solution to the key management
problem. Furthermore, the challenges and realities of com-
munication in the avionic environment need to be taken into
account, for example the extremely lossy environment (as
recently examined and illustrated with OpenSky, an open
research sensor network in [22], [118]) that might render many
traditional approaches infeasible.
For the urgent problem at hand, this means that incremental
changes with backwards compatibility kept in mind as a
main factor are more useful than completely new proposals.
Improvement on transparent secure location verification ap-
proaches such as multilateration can help bridge the security
gap in the very near future, although this means losing some
of the advantages for which ADS-B was originally developed.
In the same vain, fingerprinting methods on various layers
can help build an effective intrusion detection system against
all but the most sophisticated attackers without affecting the
protocol as it is currently deployed. Improvements on current
data fusion algorithms can also further both safety and security
of currently deployed ATC by reducing error margins and
uncertainties for controllers.
Of course, cost and complexity of deployment cannot be
the only factors taken into consideration - not having security
is famously even much more expensive.27 As mentioned
throughout this survey, it can be a useful dichotomy to
distinguish between attack detection, attack prevention and
dealing with suspected attacks. We focused mainly on attack
detection and prevention, leaving attack reaction for future
research.
VII. CONCLUSION
This survey sought to review the available research on
the topic of securing the ADS-B protocol in particular and
air traffic control communication in general. We provided
an in-depth overview of the existing work, both specific
to ADS-B as well as ideas brought in from related fields
such as VANETs. After reviewing the literature, it seems
that the solutions currently under consideration (and in use
in practice such as multilateration) can only be a fill-in,
providing a quick improvement to the security of the current
system. For all-encompassing security (and possibly privacy),
new message types and/or completely new protocols would
need to be defined. Taking this into account for the creation
of a long-term security solution in dependent air traffic
surveillance, it makes sense to consider the impact of both
secure broadcast authentication approaches as well as of
secure location verification. To avoid new hard challenges in
the foreseeable future, this should include a thorough analysis
of the predicted traffic density on today’s wireless navigation
channels as well as the possible impact of the communication
and message overhead of a new protocol.
27“If you think safety is expensive, try an accident”, an insight by easyJet
owner Stelios Haji-Ioannou that came after facing manslaughter charges for
the deaths of employees in a shipping disaster at a former company.
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